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There are many circumstances in which posthumous concep-
tion or reproduction takes place.1 This article is limited to a dis-
cussion of what has been described as the "quagmire" of postmor-
tem gamete acquisition for purposes of subsequent conception.2 I
factor out postmortem gamete retrieval from other postmortem
reproduction because it is usually non volitional and because the
law governing this practice is so underdeveloped. Accordingly, it
raises legal and ethical issues not necessarily present with other
types of postmortem procreation.
For over thirty years it has been possible to retrieve sperm
from males who are deceased, brain dead, comatose or in a per-
sistent vegetative state for use in procreation by the recipient.'
Although harvesting gametes from dead women is not a current
practice, I include female gamete retrieval because it may soon
be possible to obtain ovarian slices for future ovarian stimulation
Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University.
See Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous
Procreation, 75 NC L Rev 901 (1997) (discussing philosophical and moral dimensions of
posthumous reproduction occurring "when an individual or couple elects to cryopreserve
gametes or embryos and subsequently, one or both of the contributors dies, or when gam-
etes are harvested from a dead body").
2 See E.E. Gottenger and H.M. Nagler, The Quagmire of Postmortem Sperm Acqui-
sition, 20 J Andrology 458 (1999) (reviewing medical and legal literature regarding post-
mortem sperm acquisition).
3 See, for example, Cappy Miles Rothman, A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in
the Postmortem State, 34 Fertility and Sterility 512 (1980) (discussing surgical exposure
and irrigation of the vas deferens to retrieve sperm in a case involving a family's request
to extract and freeze the sperm of a thirty-year-old male who died following a motorcycle
accident). The first pregnancy that resulted from such postmortem sperm retrieval was
reported in the lay press in 1998 and the first live birth in 1999. Carson Strong, Ethical
and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval After Death or Persistent Vegetative State, 27 J L
Med & Ethics 347, 347 (1999). The first report of a birth from such a procedure was pub-
lished in peer-reviewed literature in 2001. Arnold M. Belker, et al, Live Birth After
Sperm Retrieval From a Moribund Man, 76 Fertility and Sterility 841 (2001).
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and fertilization through in vitro fertilization ("IVF').' Further, if
a woman is in a persistent vegetative state, it may be possible to
stimulate her ovaries and retrieve her eggs for fertilization and
storage as frozen pre-embryos.5 The day may come, moreover,
when the medical technology will exist so that the husband may
seek to have his brain-dead wife put on life support, inseminated
with his sperm, and continued on life support so that she may
bear his child.
When physicians face a request to remove sperm from a
dead or dying male or ovarian tissue from a woman who has suf-
fered sudden death or is declared brain-dead, the physician is
presented with ethical and legal issues of profound dimensions
but scant direction as to the proper course of action. The pleas of
a bereaved spouse or parents arise from the tragic circum-
stances, which evoke compassion and an understandable desire
to lessen the survivor's suffering.6 Nevertheless, acceding to a
request for gamete retrieval raises questions of who, if anyone,
may give consent, what informed consent means in these circum-
stances, and whether the dead or dying have procreative rights
that must be respected.
In this Article, I explore the debate on the appropriate
framework for evaluating the bio-ethics regarding postmortem
gamete retrieval and unitization ("PMGR"). Given the legal void
surrounding PMGR, some teaching hospitals have developed pro-
tocols to provide guidance to physicians who face requests for
PMGR. I examine these guidelines through the lens of reproduc-
tive liberty and conclude that the protocols accord too much
power over procreative choice to the medical professionals in-
volved in deciding whether to honor a request for PMGR.
4 James J. Finnerty, et al, Gamete Retrieval in Terminal Conditions: Is It Practical?
What are the ConsequencesZ 2 Current Women's Health Reports 175-78 (2002). See also
Michael R. Soules, Commentary: Posthumous Harvesting of Gametes A Physician's Per-
spective, 27 J L Med & Ethics 362, 362-63 (1999) (stating that "ovarian cryopreservation
technology has proceeded far enough that it can now be considered reasonable to offer
cryopreservation to women shortly after death or during a persistent vegetative state").
5 Soules, 27 J L Med & Ethics at 362-63 (cited in note 4). In either case, a surrogate
gestator will be necessary to carry the pre-embryos to term.
6 See, for example, Cappy Miles Rothman, Live Sperm, Dead Bodies, 20 J Andrology
456 (1999) (contending that "to bestow such consolation [by collecting sperm from dead
men] at a time of grief and tragedy is clearly part of my role as a healer"). Dr. Rothman, a
urologist and andrologist, was one of the first to report postmortem harvesting of viable
sperm. Rothman, 34 Fertility & Sterility at 512 (cited in note 3).
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I. DIFFERENTIATING TYPES OF POSTMORTEM REPRODUCTION
A. Postmortem Births
Postmortem births have occurred for as long as humankind
has existed-certainly as long as men have gone to war.' Concep-
tion in these cases was purposeful in the sense that the male was
aware that a pregnancy might result from his act of sexual inter-
course. The conception, however, was followed by the untimely
death of the father from accident, illness, or violence before the
child's birth.8 These postmortem births do not take place in a
legal void. The laws of inheritance have had rules governing
postmortem births for centuries.9
Females have given birth after death; that is, babies have
been delivered from the body of a woman within minutes of her
death.' ° As with males who died before the birth of the child, con-
ception in these instances took place before death. Further,
medical literature in the English language reports that since
1979 there have been at least eleven cases of irreversibly brain-
damaged women whose lives were prolonged for the benefit of
the developing fetus." These pregnant women would have died
too early in their pregnancies to deliver, so they were kept on life
support in the hope that the fetus would survive to viability. 2
Even here there is some legal guidance, controversial though it
is. In the majority of American states, laws addressing living
wills and health care proxies provide that an advance directive
clearly stating a pregnant woman's wishes regarding end of life
care is to be disregarded. 3
7 The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
("ASRM"), Posthumous Reproduction, 82 Fertility and Sterility Supp 1 (Sept 2004).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See, for example Daniel Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, 30 Am J L & Med 453,
454 n 7 (2004) (noting that the term "Caesareans" traditionally referred to actions "car-
ried out on women who had died before delivering their babies").
n Infant Born to Dying Mother Dies as a Result ofInfection, NY Times A18 (Sept 13,
2005).
12 See, for example, James M. Jordan III, Incubating for the State: The Precarious
Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead Pregnant Women, 22 Ga L Rev
1103 (1988) (discussing cases involving the rights of vegetative or brain-dead pregnant
women). See also Richard Paige, Postmortem Pregnancies: A Legal Analysis, 9 Dis-
patches 2 (King's College London) (2000) (discussing the maintenance of brain-dead preg-
nant women in Britain).
13 See Bretton H. Homer, A Survey of Living Wills and Advanced Health Care Direc-
tives, 74 N D L Rev 233 (1998) (reporting that thirty-six states prohibit the withdrawal of
life support from a pregnant woman).
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B. Premortem Gamete Cryopreservation
Medical technology permits postmortem conception where a
gamete donor has purposely given his sperm over to cryopreser-
vation or banking, as the practice is sometimes called.14 There
are several reasons that a male might pursue such a course. The
sperm may have been cryopreserved before a vasectomy in order
to provide the option of fatherhood if the male later changes his
mind. 5 Curative chemotherapy and radiotherapy have gonadal
toxicity as an important adverse effect.16 Accordingly, for years
men have had their sperm frozen before undergoing radiation
and chemotherapy 7 or, in the case of astronauts, going into
space, lest the experience render them sterile or cause genetic
damage to their sperm. 8 Concerned about exposure to chemical
or biological weapons, some American troops deployed to the
Middle East have deposited their sperm in sperm banks for their
own use later. 9 In each of these instances another motive may
also be present: preserving their genetic potential in case the
sperm bankers die from the disease, do not return from space, or
are killed in war.2 °
The banking of frozen sperm opens the possibility of procrea-
tion by these men long after their deaths, as does the cryopreser-
vation of pre-embryos created for use in IVF.2 In the absence of
14 For a general discussion, see, J. Y. Sherman, Research on Frozen Hman Semen:
Past, Present and Future, 15 Fertility and Sterility 485 (1964). See also E. Donald
Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow & the Sperm: The Law of Postmortem
Insemination 1 J L & Health 229, 234 (1986-87) (providing a detailed history of artificial
insemination).
15 Gottenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology at 458 (cited in note 2).
16 A.K Schroder, K. Diedrich, and M. Ludwig, Strategies for Preventing Chemother-
apy and Radiotherapy Induced GonadalDamage, 3 Amer J Cancer 97 (2004).
17 Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 Ariz L
Rev 91 (2004).
18 W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile
Decedent, 48 A B A J 942 (1962).
19 Knaplund, 46 Ariz L Rev at 91 (cited in note 17).
20 See, for example, Belinda Bennett, Posthumous Reproduction and the Meaning of
Autonomy, 23 Melb U L Rev 286, 302 n 112 (1999), quoting Robert Jansen, Sperm and
Ova as Property, 11 J Med Ethics 123, 125 (1985), on reasons men bank semen:
[Mien often store semen when they have a life-threatening disease. On the face
of it, the motive may seem to be that they are to receive cancer-killing drugs
which are likely . .. to destroy the sperm-forming tissue of the testes. But...
they often have another motive: to protect their genetic potential in the event
they die as a result of their disease. Many dying patients take comfort in the
fact that they have children, that it is not the end of the road genetically.
Id.
21 John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 Ind L J 1027 (1994).
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specific instructions, postmortem conception, or in the case of 0lie
pre-embryos, implantation, under these circumstances raises
issues of the progenitors' intention to procreate after death. Con-
sent forms for cryopreservation of gametes or pre-embryos, how-
ever, usually have instructions for the disposition of the gametes
or pre-embryos if the progenitors die leaving genetic material in
22storage. The very limited decisional law in this area establishes
that public policy is not violated when the decedent has expressly
stated that a named individual may be impregnated with the
sperm. 23 Moreover, issues of a resulting child's inheritance, sur-
vivor's benefits, and parentage are gradually being answered by
legislatures and the courts.24
C. Gamete Retrieval from the Dead or Comatose
In addition to the above instances of postmortem procrea-
tion, it is possible to retrieve gametes from individuals who are
deceased, brain dead, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative
state ("PVS") for use in procreation by the recipient. There are a
variety of techniques that can be used. For males, these include
"stimulated ejaculation, micro surgical epididymal sperm aspira-
tion or testicular sperm extraction."25 In some cases insemination
will have to be achieved using intra cytoplasmic sperm injection,
a technique in which an egg is fertilized using a single sperm
even though the practice may increase the risks of birth defects
in the child born as a result of the procedure.26
Recently, women undergoing treatment or suffering from a
disease that may result in their sterility have the option of creat-
ing pre-embryos to be cryopreserved.27 More recently they have
22 Soules, 27 J L Med & Ethics at 363 (cited in note 4) ("In fact, the cryopreservation
consent would be considered incomplete if it did not address the posthumous disposition
of the sperm or embryos.").
23 See Hecht v Superior Court of Los Angeles, 59 Cal Rptr 2d 222 (Cal Ct App 1996)
(order not published) (finding that neither court nor adult children possess reason or
right to prevent decedent from procreating with the woman of his choice in the context of
will contest); Hall v Fertiity Institute of New Orleans, 647 S2d 1348 (1994) (stating that
"the act of donation by which now deceased donor conveyed ownership of frozen sperm did
not violate public policy and donee's proposed artificial insemination was not contra bonos
mores").
24 See generally, Michael K. Elliott, Tales of Parenthood from the Crypt: The Pre-
dicament of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 39 Real Prop Prob & Tr 47 (2004) (dis-
cussing case law and recommending legislative solutions to rights of posthumous child).
25 ASRM, 82 Fertility and Sterility Supp 1 (cited in note 7).
26 Gottenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology at 460 (cited in note 2).
27 See, for example, Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and
Asexual Reproduction, 8 Alb L J Sci & Tech 1, 35-39 (1997) (discussing cryopreservation
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been offered the option of having their ovaries removed and
cryopreserved." Women have had their ovarian tissue auto-
grafted back in their bodies with successful hormone functioning
for a period of time29 and at least one live birth after transplant
of ovarian tissue has been achieved.30 Moreover, there are recent
advances in egg-freezing techniques that may allow this practice
to be a reproductive option for women who have to delay mother-
hood for social or medical reasons.' It is likely, therefore, that
postmortem gamete retrieval from females will become a reality
in the near future. 2
II. THE EXTENT OF THE PRACTICE OF POSTMORTEM GAMETE
RETRIEVAL
Is PMGR really an issue worthy of our consideration, or is it
such a rarity that it is of academic interest only? The fact is that
requests for PMGR are numerous, they appear on a worldwide
basis, and their number is expected to grow. Moreover, the num-
ber of requests increases every time headlines such as "Woman
pregnant with sperm from a corpse"33 make the news.
of embryos and the legal implications arising with the death of the potential parents).
28 See, for example, K Oktay, et al, A Technique for Transplantation of Ovarian
Cortical Strips to the Forearm, 80 Fertility & Sterility 193 (2003) (concluding that "het-
erotrophic transplantation of ovarian tissue to the forearm is simple and promising tech-
nique to restore ovarian function in women who have become menopausal due to chemo-
therapy, surgery, or radiation"); Schmidt KL. Tryde, et al, Orthotopic Auto Transplanta-
tion of Cryopreserved Ovarian Tissue to a Woman Cured of Cancer-Follicular Growth,
Steroid Production and Oocyte Retrieval, Reprod Biomed Online 448 (2004) (reporting
that cryopreserved human ovarian tissue restored ovarian function for several cycles and
supported development of mature oocytes in women cured of cancer).
29 Soules, 27 J L Med & Ethics at 363 (cited in note 4).
30 j. Donnez, et al, Live Birth After Orthotopic Transplantation of Cryopreserved
Ovarian Tissue, Lancet, available at <http'//www.saintluc.be/press/commu/tamara
lancet-complet.pdf> (last visited at Jan 26, 2006).
31 See, for example, Mark Henderson, Frozen Eggs Allow Women to put Motherhood
on Ice, The Times Online, available at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/O,,8122-
1670393,00.html> (last visited Jan 26, 2006) (describing research undertaken in Bologna,
Italy by Eleanora Porcu that demonstrates that egg-freezing is as viable an option as
embryo freezing). See Sarah Wildman, Stop Time, New York Magazine 24 (Oct 17, 2005)
(discussing the possibility that young women could freeze their eggs in order to have
procreative options when they are older).
32 Finnerty, et al, 2 Current Women's Health Rep at 176 (cited in note 4).
33 Carson Strong, Consent to Sperm Retrieval and Insemination AAer Death or Per-
sistent Vegetative State, 14 J L & Health 243, 269 n 7 (1999-2000).
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A. Sperm Retrieval
In 1980 the first report of a successful PMGR of sperm was
published.34 Since then, requests for the procedure have been
increasingly frequent and are expected to grow with each media
report of a baby's birth following PMGR.3 5 Wives, fianc6es, and
girlfriends request sperm retrieval from a dead, near dead, or
dying male in order that the male's sperm may be frozen and
later used for procreation, that is, to produce his genetic off-
spring.36 There are instances where the parents of male patients
have sought the sperm in hopes of finding a woman who will
agree to serve as a surrogate wife; that is, she will agree to be
inseminated with the decedent's sperm and bear them a grand-
child.37 Others, including social workers, family friends, or inten-
sive care nurses, have also made requests. 3 In some cases the
request was made for an anonymous donation.39 Occasionally,
the male whose sperm is desired is not yet dead but is comatose
or in a persistent vegetative state.a
Some hospitals have guidelines that dictate that certain
medical conditions must be present before a physician who is
willing to accede to the request for PMGR may go forward. For
instance, New York Presbyterian Hospital requires that if re-
trieval is postmortem, the death should be sudden and "not due
to communicable disease or disease known to adversely affect
spermatogenesis."41 If the patient is dead, the sperm must be
harvested within twenty-four hours of death.4 ' There must be a
34 Strong, 27 J L Med & Ethics 347 (cited in note 3) (noting that since 1980 more
than ninety requests for postmortem sperm retrieval have been reported).
35 Robert D. Orr and Mark Siegler, Is Posthumous Semen Retrieval Ethically Per-
missible, 28 J Med Ethics 299 (2002).
36 See, for example, Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator, NY Times Magazine 64
(March 28, 1999) (describing first successful pregnancy using sperm collected after the
father's death). I use the term "male" instead of "man" because in some cases the male
who is dead or dying has not obtained his majority.
37 See, for example, Laura A. Dwyer, Dead Daddies: Issues in Postmortem Reproduc-
tion, 52 Rutgers L Rev 881 (2000) (discussing issues raised by parents' request for sperm
removal from their dying nineteen-year-old son so that his mother could be a "grandma").
38 Steven E. Kahan, Allen D. Seftel, and Martin I. Resnick, Postmortem Sperm Pro-
curement: A Legal Perspective, 161 J Urology 1840, 1842 (1999).
39 Id.
4) See, for example, Strong, 14 J L & Health at 250-51 (cited in note 33) (discussing
the legal status of consent to postmortem sperm retrieval).
41 New York Hospital Guidelines for Consideration of Requests for Postmortem
Sperm Retrieval ("New York Hospital Guidelines"), available at <http'//www.cornellurol-
ogy.com/uro/cornell/guidelines.shtml> (last visited Jan 24, 2006).
42 Id.
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nearby sperm cryobank to immediately process the retrieved
sperm.a3 Retrieval of the sperm does not guarantee that the one
requesting the retrieval will be allowed to utilize it. In fact, it has
been suggested that PMGR without the likelihood of its use
might "represent a mutilation of the dead that may represent a
lack of respect.""
B. Postmortem Egg Retrieval
The harvesting of gametes from dead women does not ap-
pear to be a current practice but it is predicted that it soon will
become feasible. 5 Even in the living, retrieving eggs is more
medically complex than sperm retrieval.46 This is due to the need
for advance preparation, such as ovarian stimulation with go-
nadotropin, which encourages the production of mature eggs, and
collection of the eggs transvaginally, which occurs with a needle
while the patient is under a local anesthetic.47 Thus, if attempted
with a dead woman, it would necessitate delay in burying or oth-
erwise disposing of the body.
A more realistic possibility for egg retrieval exists if the
woman is in a PVS. It may be possible to stimulate her ovaries
and retrieve eggs for fertilization and storage as frozen pre-
embryos.4" Or, it may be possible to obtain ovarian slices for fu-
ture ovarian stimulation and fertilization through IVF.49
This last point brings up another complicating factor with
female gamete retrieval. Unlike postmortem sperm retrieval,
there is a need for another woman to gestate the pre-embryo.
Finally, it requires no imagination to foresee a development re-
lated to keeping a pregnant woman on life support in order to
incubate her fetus until viability. The day may come when the
medical technology will exist so that a husband may seek to have
4 Id.
4 Id.
46 Finnerty, et al, 2 Current Women's Health Reports at 176 (cited in note 4) ("We
have reviewed the process by which male and female gametes could be retrieved and
stored for future reproduction, and determined that it is possible, within certain limita-
tions, for this to be done.").
46 Although the first pregnancy from a cryopreserved egg was achieved in 1986, it has
taken almost twenty years for cryopreservation of eggs to become a viable procedure,
since defrosting the eggs has often destroyed them. Henderson, Times Online Health
News, (June 27, 2005) (cited in note 31). Britain did not legalize the defrosting and im-
plantation of frozen eggs until 2000. Id.
47 Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification,
56 Rutgers L Rev 305, 391-92 (2004).
48 Finnerty, et al, 2 Current Women's Health Rep at 175-76 (cited in note 4).
49 Id at 176.
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his brain-dead wife inseminated with his sperm and kept on lie
support so that she may bear his child.5"
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOCOLS
Physicians in the United States who receive requests for
PMGR have little to guide them in determining whether to ac-
cede to the requests. The mere technical feasibility of PMGR does
not warrant the procedure's use. There are ethical, moral, and
legal questions that must be answered before a physician may
take sperm from a male corpse or gametes from a deceased fe-
male so that these deceased may reproduce. There is an abun-
dance of medical and legal literature discussing PMGR, but there
is scant legal authority directly on point in the United States.5 If
we look for governing law on the legality of PMGR and subse-
quent use of the gametes for conception, the most cited authority
is the case of Diane Blood, decided by the courts of Great Brit-
ain.52
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
("HFEA") in Great Britain prevented Diane Blood from storing or
utilizing sperm taken from her dying husband because Mr. Blood
had not given his written permission after having had a proper
opportunity to receive counseling.53 Mrs. Blood then sought per-
mission to export the sperm to Belgium, where the law would
permit her to use the sperm.' The HFEA ruled that Mrs. Blood
was barred from taking the sperm abroad for use on the ground
50 See Richard V. Grazi and Joel B. Wolowelsky, Parenthood from the Grave, 65
Jewish Spectator 4 (2001) (suggesting the possibility of postmortem insemination and
pregnancy).
51 See, for example, Kahan, Seftel, and Resnick, 161 J Urology at 1840 (cited in note
38) (concluding, after review of state and federal laws, uniform acts and medical and law
review articles, that no state or federal statute establishes standard protocol or proce-
dural guidelines). See also J. Dostal, et al, Postmortem sperm retrieval in new European
Union countries: Case report, 20 Human Reproduction 2359 (2005) (discussing the lack of
guidance in laws of countries of the European Union). But see La Rev Stat Ann
§ 14:101.2D (West 2004) (providing that the deceased spouse must have consented to the
use of his sperm by the surviving spouse); Wash Rev Code Ann § 26.26.730 (West Supp
2005) (requiring deceased spouse's consent to postmortem conception). Arguably these
provisions are intended for the situation where sperm is frozen prior to the man's death.
Margaret Ward Scott, Comment, A Look at the Rights and Entitlements of Posthumously
Conceived Children: No Surefire Way to Tame the Reproductive Wild West, 52 Emory L J
963, 966 (2003).
52 Regina v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ex parte Blood, 2 All E R
687 (C A 1997). See Margaret Foster Reilly and Richard Merrill, Regulating Reproductive
Genetics, 6 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 1, 56-57 (2005) (discussing Bloodin detail).
5 Reilly and Merrill, 6 Colun Sci & Tech L Rev at 56 (cited in note 52).
5 ExParte Blood, 2 All E R at 687.
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that she should not be able to avoid the specific requirements of
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act by exporting the
sperm to a country to which she had no connection.55
Mrs. Blood sought judicial review of the Authority's decision.
In the litigation that followed, the Court of Appeal upheld the
HFEA on the issue of consent but found that Mrs. Blood had the
right to export the sperm under the European Community
Treaty, which guarantees freedom of movement for goods and
medical services among member states.56 As a result of the High
Court's finding that HFEA was incompatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights, Mrs. Blood eventually was able to
have two sons using the frozen sperm.57 Yet, after their birth
Mrs. Blood could not place her deceased husband's name on her
sons' birth certificates because HFEA declared that any baby
conceived after his father's death had no biological father for the
purposes of succession and inheritance." Eventually, Mrs. Blood
succeeded in getting the Act amended to provide that children
conceived postmortem would be recognized as the legal heirs of
their deceased father.59
The international publicity generated by Mrs. Blood's effort
to have children with her late husband demonstrates how com-
pelling the facts may be when a loved one dies suddenly before
he or she has had a chance to become a parent.6" The legal reso-
lution of the case, however, is of little help in the United States,
where the very idea of a central licensing authority for reproduc-
tive technology is anathema to our belief in state, as opposed to
federal, control of medical practice and parentage issues.6 Of
course, in the case of reproductive technology there is virtually




58 Ex Parte Blood, 2 All E R at 687.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Consider Reilly and Merrill, 6 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 1 (cited in note 52) (exam-
ining the role of government institutions in designing regulations of assisted reproduction
and technologies). See also Alicia Ouellette, et al, Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted
Reproductive Technology in the United K'ngdom and the United States, 31 Am J L &
Med 419 (2005) (describing the approach used in the United Kingdom to issues of repro-
ductive technology).
62 See Robert Jansen, Evidence-Based Ethics and the Regulation of Reproduction, 12
Human Reproduction 2068, 2073 (1997) (mentioning the laissez-faire-that is, predomi-
nantly commercial-competitive approach in the United States to reproductive technol-
ogy).
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ment authority.
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM")
has determined that medical personnel do not have to honor a
surviving spouse's request for PMGR if the patient has not given
prior consent or else made his wishes known." The ASRM avoids
the issue of whether PMGR is permissible by stating that "such
requests pose judgmental questions that should be answered
within the context of the individual circumstances and applicable
state laws."'" Inasmuch as there are few applicable state laws,
the ASRM's statement provides little guidance but may be read
to permit PMGR. There is some legislative and judicial direction
on issues such as inheritance after posthumous conception, the
status of cryopreserved pre-embryos, and parentage when do-
nated gametes are used to achieve pregnancy, but nothing spe-
cifically addresses PMGR.65
Although requests for PMGR occur in a legal void, time is of
the essence when a request for PMGR is made. Unlike removing
a respirator or discontinuing nutrition or hydration, where the
status quo continues while decisions are made, with PMGR there
is a very small window of opportunity in which to act.66 More-
over, the situation is often tragic, involving the sudden death of
someone who is relatively young. Experience documents that in
the absence of restrictive protocols, physicians have difficulty
resisting the pleas of a wife, parent, or lover who request
PMGR.67 Many physicians have acceded to requests for PMGR on
the assumption that there were no significant legal objections.68
Physicians' acquiescence may also be a function of their sympa-
thetic impulses and the gratification of offering help to the be-
reaved.69
r3 ASRM, 82 Fertility and Sterility Supp at S261 (cited in note 7).
64 Id.
r5 Consider Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will,
46 Ariz L Rev 91 (2004) (discussing questions of inheritance and postmortem conception);
Sharona Hoffman and Andrew Moriss, Birth After Death: Perpetuities and the New Re-
productive Technologies, 38 Ga L Rev 575 (2004) (discussing the threat new reproductive
technologies impose upon the rule against perpetuities); Kristine S. Knaplund, Equal
Protection, Postmortem Conception, and Intestacy, 53 U Kan L Rev 627 (2005) (discuss-
ing the claim for Social Security survivor benefits of a child conceived postmortem).
66 Gottenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology at 459 (cited in note 2).
67 Id.
68 See Andrews, The Sperminator, NY Times Mag at 65 (cited in note 36) (highlight-
ing anecdotal incidents involving patient requests for gamete harvesting).
SUU iUCwn1ml, 54 Fel' iiity and Suericiiy at 5i2 kcited in note &).
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As a consequence of the lack of guidance on the acceptability
of PMGR, some medical institutions have developed their own
protocols to assist physicians, who are usually urologists or
emergency room physicians, in assessing requests for PMGR.7°
The institutions have forged ahead despite the uncertainty sur-
rounding the legality of PMGR. At New York Presbyterian Hos-
pital, for example, as soon as the hospital received its first re-
quest for PMGR, guidelines were formulated with input from
legal experts, psychologists, medical ethicists, institutional rep-
resentatives, and medical experts."'
IV. THE ETHICAL DEBATE
Protocols or standards for PMGR have been developed
against a background debate on the ethics of retrieval and reflect
various positions advanced in that debate. The three main views
at play in this debate include a restrictive approach, a permissive
approach, and an approach that takes guidance from both the
restrictive and permissive extremes. The issue of consent is the
starting point for proponents of all views. There is little dispute
that some form of premortem consent of the decedent is re-
quired. 2 One could argue that the dead have no rights or inter-
ests; that since the dead cannot be harmed, there is no reason
that a grieving spouse should not be able to conceive a child with
gametes acquired after the progenitor's death. If one adopts this
position, it is difficult to see why the decedent's gametes should
not be harvested for use in anonymous donation, particularly if
he or she is a fine physical specimen or unusually talented. In
the debate over standards for PMGR, however, there is no voice
advocating the complete dismissal of the wishes of the dead,73
although it is recognized that reproductive autonomy has a very
70 See Kahan, Seftel, and Resnick, 161 J Urology at 1840 (cited in note 38) (introduc-
ing the lack of protocol for urologists asked to retrieve sperm from recently deceased
patients).
71 New York Hospital Guidelines (cited in note 41). See also Soules, 27 J L Med &
Ethics at 364 (cited in note 4) (discussing University of Washington protocol for gamete
harvesting after death).
72 See, for example, Strong, 14 J L & Health at 267 (cited in note 33) (proposing that
statutes should deny authority to retrieve sperm from dead males without explicit prior
consent or convincing evidence that he would approve).
73 The exception to this statement is found in the Superior Court of Richmond County
decision involving a brain-dead pregnant woman. See Jordan, 22 Ga L Rev at 1108-12
(cited in note 12) (discussing University Health Services, Inc v Piazzi, No CV86-RCCV-
464 (Super Ct of Richmond County, Ga Aug 4, 1986), where the court held that the consti-
tutional rights of a brain-dead pregnant woman were extinguished at death).
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the decision to reproduce is of such moment and has such a
deeply personal nature that procreative autonomy survives
death.75 The disagreement is over which guidelines best respect
the decedent's reproductive autonomy.
The difference between the most restrictive and the more
permissive positions is whether explicit prior consent of the de-
ceased or incompetent is required or, as in the permissive proto-
cols, reasonably inferred consent fulfills the need for consent.
The most permissive position would create a presumption in fa-
vor of PMGR in the absence of evidence that the decedent made
his or her opposition clear while alive. Even those who adopt the
most expansive stance toward PMGR do so in the belief that they
espouse what the decedent would have wanted, had he or she
thought about the matter. Whichever protocol is adopted, the
other guidelines are sufficiently exclusionary that they have
"dramatically" reduced the number of postmortem gamete re-
trievals performed.76
A. Restrictive Approach
Proponents of restrictive legislation or standards regarding
PMGR and conception frame their arguments in terms of indi-
vidual autonomy and procreative rights.77 Further, they express
concerns about respectful treatment of the deceased's body.7" Pro-
fessor Anne Reichman Schiff is one of the most forceful propo-
nents of respect for the decedent's procreative interests. Speak-
ing of the "deep human need ... to treat the dead with respect
and reverence, " " she notes: "Arguably, therefore, if the state al-
lowed family members to utilize the gametes of the dead for pro-
creation without the deceased's consent, the lack of assurance
74 See, for example, Robertson, 69 Ind L J at 1031 (cited in note 21) (discussing the
value of reproduction for the living because of the "genetic, gestational and rearing ex-
periences involved" and raising question of whether posthumous reproduction is a mean-
ingful experience, that is, "to know in advance that one's genes might (or might not) be
used to produce offspring after one's death").
75 Bennett, 23 Melb U L Rev at 286 (cited in note 20).
76 Jennifer A. Tash, et al, Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The Effect of Instituting
Guidelines, 170 J Urology 1922 (2003).
77 See, for example, Robertson, 69 Ind L J at 1027-28 (cited in note 21) (discussing
the "normative preeminence" of personal autonomy in bioethics).
78 See, for example, Orr and Siegler, 28 J Med Ethics 299 (cited in note 35); Anne
Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges ofPosthumous Procreation, 75 N C L
Rev 901 (1997); Anne Reichman Schiff, Posthumous Conception and the Need for Con-
sent 170 Med J Australia 53 (1999).
Schif, 75 iN C L aev aL zY46 kcitd in now 7).
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that individuals would have about the fate of their own body
parts could be a source of apprehension to the living.""° We also
need assurance that our wishes not to leave partial orphans will
survive our death."1 Apprehension about the welfare of any re-
sulting children who will be born without the opportunity to
know their genetic fathers also informs the more restrictive
views.82
This restrictive view is one that still permits PMGR in some
circumstances: it requires that the decedent must have executed
an advance directive "that indicates explicitly his or her willing-
ness to have the procedure performed in these specific circum-
stances . *. .. "" This is the policy adopted by the University of
Virginia, a policy that further requires that the advance directive
name the individual who can request PMGR, "inherit the stored
samples[,] and be a partner in future procreative attempts."84
Moreover, the University's policy demands that the advance di-
rective address the issue of parentage so as to avoid challenges
involving the estate of the gamete donor and resulting off-
spring.8 5
B. Permissive Approach
Proponents of permissive legislation or standards regarding
PMGR contend that respect for the dead is best served by allow-
ing posthumous conception, thereby satisfying the interest of the
deceased in parenthood.86 Some of the more expansive philoso-
phical positions come from Australia, a country, ironically, in
which postmortem conception has been banned in a number of
states.8 7 Dr. Malcolm Parker of Mayne Medical School, Queens-
land, Australia, questions the restrictive view of posthumous in-
s0 Id (citing Paul M. Quay, Utilizing the Bodies of the Dead, 28 St Louis U L J 889,
920 (1984)).
s3 Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduc-
tion, 8 Alb L J Sci & Tech 1, 39 (1997).
82 See, for example, Gottenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology 460-61 (cited in note 2).
s3 Finnerty, et al, 2 Current Women's Health Reports 175 (cited in note 4).
84 Id.
85 Id. The University of Virginia's policy was developed by the members of the Ethics
Consult Service and Ethics Committee, the director of the Human Gamete and Embryo
Laboratory, a urologist and a reproductive endocrinologist. Id.
86 Dr. Malcolm Parker, Response to Orr and Siegler--Collective Intentionaity and
Procreative Desires: The Permissible View on Consent to Posthumous Conception, 30 J
Med Ethics 389 (2004). Consider Orr and Siegler, 28 J Med Ethics 299 (cited in note 35).
87 See, for example, Parker, 30 J Med Ethics at 390 (cited in note 86) ("Laws, guide-
lines and the courts in the UK and Australia have also generally supported the restrictive
view.").
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semination and conception currently dominating iaw and prac-
tice, a restrictive view based on "rights conceived exclusively as
owned by individuals."8 He contends that postmortem sperm
retrieval should be allowed unless the decedent had explicitly
refused to allow sperm retrieval or where there is "no reasonable
evidence that the deceased person desired children."89 Dr. Parker
defends his presumption in favor of posthumous conception by
postulating that people generally desire to become parents. Fur-
ther, that desire is more than a wish to be an active (and pre-
sent) parent; the desire to be a parent includes a desire to ex-
perience genetic integration with a partner, to advance one's
lineage, and to experience having a child with one's partner. °
Dr. Rebecca Collins of the University of Western Australia
also challenges the requirement, common throughout Australia,
that the decedent's prior consent to posthumous reproduction is
necessary before sperm may retrieved.9 Dr. Collins argues that
since the majority of requests for PMGR occur when there is a
sudden and unexpected death, "it is essential to consider
whether the legal equation of lack of consent with refusal of con-
sent is justified."92 Dr. Collins posits that there are many reasons
to suppose that people would likely consent to posthumous re-
production, had they contemplated it. A prime reason is concern
for survivors, that is, the deceased would want to promote the
happiness of his loved ones.93 Moreover, most people want to per-
petuate their genes.' And a person might also be willing to con-
sent to posthumous reproduction in order to have a life plan ful-
filled.95 Finally, there is a lack of evidence that posthumous birth
is harmful to children.96
One of the justifications for a presumption against consent is
that, given that posthumous reproduction is not a norm in our
society, "it is unfair and undesirable to place the onus upon indi-
viduals to state their opposition to posthumous reproduction."97
Dr. Collins replies that this argument is irrelevant in cases of
88 Id at 392.
89 Id at 389.
90 Id at 390-91.
91 Rebecca Collins, Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent
in Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma, 30 J Med & Philosophy 431 (2005).
92 Id at 433.
93 Id at 435.
9 Id at 435-36.
95 Collins, 30 J Med & Philosophy at 435-36 (cited in note 91).
96 Id at 435.
" Id at 436, quoting Schiff, 170 Med J Australia at 53 (cited in note 78).
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sudden death (although she does not make clear why this should
be so).9" Finally, Dr. Collins dismisses concerns about the repro-
ductive autonomy of the deceased with the statement that "the
mere lack of contemplation by the deceased of a particular use of
his or her body or is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
of disrespectful use."99
C. Hybrid Approach
Extremely permissive views such of those of Drs. Parker and
Collins, however, do not enjoy widespread support. Instead, the
prevailing view is that some affirmative evidence of the dece-
dent's wish to procreate after death is needed before posthumous
gamete retrieval is ethically permissible."' In fact, many coun-
tries simply prohibit all posthumous reproduction.1 1 While not
prohibiting posthumous storage and use of sperm, Great Britain
requires the prior written permission of the decedent. 2
An intermediate position would permit PMGR based on the
reasonably inferred consent of the decedent or person in a
PVS.'03 Relying on the case of organ donation, Dr. Carson Strong
is among those who suggest that it is respectful of patient auton-
omy to "make decisions in accordance with the reasonably in-
ferred wishes of the patient.""° In refuting this supposition,
Gladys B. White notes that "most men have never considered the
possibility that sperm would be sought or put to use after death
or after diagnosis of PVS." °5 Moreover, there is a great deal of
guesswork in determining what the decedent would have wanted
had he but thought about the subject while living. Absent prior
98 Id at 437.
99 Collins, 30 J Med & Philosophy at 437-38 (cited in note 91).
100 See, for example, Strong, 14 J L & Health 243 (cited in note 33) (discussing various
rights of the deceased and the legal status of their consent to postmortem sperm re-
trieval).
101 See, for example, Kahan, Seftel, and Resnick, 161 J Urology at 1840 (cited in note
38). In Germany knowingly fertilizing an egg with the sperm of a man after his death
carries potential criminal liability. See also Ian Fisher, Bill Would Govern Use of Dead
Men's Sperm, NY Times B5 (Mar 7, 1998) (noting that a state senator's proposed bill
would allow sperm to be taken postmortem only if the man had consented in writing
before he died and the sperm could be used only by his wife or partner).
102 Kahan, Seftel, and Resnick, 161 J Urology at 1842 (cited in note 38).
103 See, for example, Strong, 27 J L Med & Ethics at 347 (cited in note 3) (outlining
methods of sperm extraction for procreative purposes from males who are deceased or in
a persistent vegetative state).
104 Id at 348. See also New York Hospital Guidelines (cited in note 41).
105 Gladys B. White, Commentary: Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sperm Retrieval, 27 J
L Med & Ethics 359 (1999).
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expicit, consent, any guess "is cle.ry ne uat. is colored by the
interests, motivations and purposes of those who are seeking to
use the sperm."106
Nevertheless, Dr. Strong argues that it is justifiable to re-
trieve gametes in the absence of explicit prior consent, that there
are sound reasons "to act in accordance with a patient's autono-
mous wishes concerning postmortem sperm retrieval, whether
those wishes are explicitly stated ... or reasonably inferred."0 7
Among the reasons to procreate during one's lifetime are: par-
ticipating in the creation of new life, affirming mutual love, con-
tributing to sexual intimacy, providing a link to future persons,
and experiencing child rearing as well as pregnancy and child-
birth.' Some of these reasons, in particular the creation of a
new person, may be applicable to postmortem procreation. More-
over, planning for procreation after the death of one of the pro-
genitors may be an expression of love and acceptance and may
contribute to self-identity. 09
Conversely, some individuals may not wish to procreate af-
ter death."' Avoiding procreation after one has died so that a
child is not born into undesirable circumstances has some
strength as an argument for respecting those decisions.'' More-
over, Dr. Strong's position, that the reasonably inferred wishes of
the decedent should be respected, is tempered by his require-
ment that the decedent has previously discussed and approved of
postmortem sperm retrieval with his family."2 Moreover, there
must be "either explicit prior or reasonably inferred consent not
only for sperm retrieval and storage but also the selection of the
woman to be the insemination recipient""' in order that the de-
cedent's procreative freedom will not be violated.
D. Protocol Specifics: Who Has the Right to Request Retrieval?
Current hospital protocols regarding PMGR ask the ques-
tion: who has the right to request retrieval? By this question it is
meant, who has the right to consent to PMGR?".4 Among most of
106 Id at 359-60.
107 Strong, 27 J L Med & Ethics at 351 (cited in note 3).
108 Id at 349-51.
109 Id.
110 Id at 350.
11 Strong, 27 J L Med & Ethics at 350 (cited in note 3).
112 Id.
'3 Id at 352.
::- Kah~an, 6ettel, and Resnik, 161 J Urology at 154U (cited in note 66) k-Urologists
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those who have considered the issue there is a shared conclusion
that laws governing organ donation or autopsies do not apply to
PMGR," 5 that organ donation and gamete retrieval are not ethi-
cally equivalent. 1 ' Arguably the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
("UAGA"), 17 adopted in some form by all fifty states, authorizes
the postmortem retrieval of gametes for use in assisted reproduc-
tion in the absence of a clear objection by the subject before he or
she died. 118 Since the Act defines "part" as "an organ, tissue, eye,
bone, artery, blood, fluid or other portion of the human body," it
has been argued that a wife should have the right to obtain her
husband's sperm postmortem.'19 Further, it is the case that au-
topsies and organ harvesting have immediate consequences to
the dead body and may be more "invasive, destructive and dis-
figuring" than sperm retrieval. 2 ° Nevertheless, gamete retrieval
followed by artificial insemination or IVF has ongoing important
effects that affect the deceased's family and his or her own leg-
acy.121 In the words of Anne Reichman Schiff, posthumous con-
ception "recasts the content and contours of the deceased's
life." 22 She adds that when it occurs without the person's con-
sent, it deprives an individual of "the right to be the conclusive
author of a highly significant chapter of his or her life." 2'
Further, the purpose of organ donation is to preserve life
and is for the medical benefit of the recipient of the organ.24 The
purposes of donation under the UAGA are "transplantation, ther-
must focus on the express intent of the decedent and limit any postmortem sperm re-
trieval to the specific requests made by the decedent.").
11" See, for example, Goettenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology at 459 (cited in note 2)
(equating organ donation and sperm donation by declaring: "Organ donation preserves a
life. Sperm donation creates a life."). Compare New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Analysis and Recommendations for Pubhlic
Policy 266 (April 1998) (It is arguable that the [Uniform Anatomical Gift Act] would
authorize the posthumous retrieval of sperm for use in assisted reproduction in the ab-
sence of clear objection by the subject before he died.").
116 White, 27 J L Med & Ethics at 359 (cited in note 105). See Schiff, 75 NC L Rev at
922-32 (cited in note 1) (discussing in detail the law relating to dead bodies and organ
donation).
117 UAGA (amended 1987), ULA Anat Gift § 8A (1993).
118 New York State Task Force, Assisted Reproductive Technologies at 266 (cited in
note 115).
119 See id (noting that the UAGA's provision allowing next of kin to consent to the
retrieval of organs and tissues after death could arguably apply to posthumous sperm
retrieval).
120 Orr and Siegler, 28 J Med Ethics at 299, 301 (cited in note 35).
121 Id.
122 Schiff, 75 NC L Rev at 944 (cited in note 1).
123 Id.
124 Gottenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology at 459 (cited in note 2).
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apy, medical or dental research, education, research, or ad-
vancement of medical or dental science."12 Utilization of a dece-
dent's gametes creates life and is for the benefit of a healthy in-
dividual.126 With PMGR, the recipient, who is usually the next of
kin and would be the one to give consent to procurement of the
sperm, stands to benefit personally. 127 Moreover, it has also been
suggested that "there is no strong social argument in favor of
bringing additional children into the world."28
Because of the legal uncertainty surrounding disposition of
gametes, the safest course of action is to require (1) that the one
making the request is the decedent, that is, a decedent who has
made a specific request when competent and of age and (2) that
the intended recipient is a spouse."' While such a practice may
ignore the desires of others, such as parents or lovers, to have
the decedent's lineage continue, it has the virtue of a bright-line
rule and avoids speculation about the deceased's intentions. No
right of parents to control the reproductive decisions of their
adult progeny is recognized in the law. The parents' desire to
have a grandchild with the genes of the deceased-that is, to
"prolong" the deceased's life though postmortem conception, or to
simply continue their lineage-is not among the recognized legal
interests.
On the other hand, the law recognizes that families are often
formed outside of marriage 3 °; therefore, someone who had ex-
plicit permission for PMGR and utilization of the gametes might
have a valid claim against the institution that denied a request.
There is legal precedent for cases in which sperm was given
premortem to a paramour. 131
125 UAGA (amended 1987), 8A ULA. 6, 8A, UnifL A 53.
126 Goettenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology at 459 (cited in note 2); Schiff, 170 Med J
Australia at 53 (cited in note 78).
127 Gottenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology at 459 (cited in note 2).
128 Id, quoting L.B. Andrews, Hearings Before the New York State Standing Commit-
tee on Investigations, Taxation and Government Operations, 220 Reg Sess (1997) (written
testimony of L.B. Andrews).
129 See, for example, Kahan, Seftel, and Resnik, 161 J Urology at 1840 (cited in note
38) (discussing the possibilities for a workable protocol for postmortem sperm procure-
ment).
130 See, for example, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 652 (1972) ("Nor has the law re-
fused to recognize those families unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.").
131 Hall v Fertility Institute of New Orleans, 647 S2d 1348, 1348 (1994). See also
Hecht v Superior Court of Los Angeles, 59 Cal Rptr 2d 222, 227 (Cal Ct App 1996) (find-
ing that sperm bequeathed to a decedents' paramour should be given to her; the children
of the decedent had no cognizable interest).
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Since the purpose of the request for PMGR is to achieve a
pregnancy, consent to PMGR requires not just consent to the
gamete retrieval but evidence of the deceased's desire to achieve
procreation. Some protocols demand explicit prior authorization;
they specify that the consent must be that of the deceased and
must have been given premortem. 132 At least one medical institu-
tion specifies that it must be documented in writing.133
Recognizing that prospective authorization for PMGR is
unlikely, other guidelines allow for "reasonably inferred" con-
sent.' The New York Hospital Guidelines provide that "only
men undergoing fertility treatment, actively attempting concep-
tion or who had specifically expressed their plans to attempt con-
ception in the immediate future would be suitable candidates for
retrieval." 13 The guidelines also state that the deceased's wife is
the one from whom evidence of the dead man's intentions should
be sought and, as the next of kin, she is most capable of giving
"procedural consent."'36 The difficulty here is allowing evidence of
conversations heard only by the wife, an interested party. The
New York Hospital Guidelines also state that the parents of the
deceased should not provide consent since the purpose of the re-
trieval is procreation with the wife. A later discussion in the
guidelines states that "if there's a discrepancy between the wife
and other family members, we [urologists] will not proceed."'37
The "consent" that is the focus of the medical protocols is not
what is usually meant by informed consent to a medical proce-
dure. The purpose of informed consent is to have the patient be
an informed participant in his or her health care. Valid and in-
formed voluntary consent for medical services requires that a
physician impart information so that the patient may make in-
formed choices about his or her medical care. The physician
should discuss the diagnosis and prognosis and disclose the risks
and benefits of the proposed treatment as well as those of alter-
native procedures, including nontreatment. Except for those in-
stitutions that require explicit, affirmative premortem permis-
132 See Kahan, Seftel, and Resnick, 161 J Urology at 1842 (cited in note 38)
("[W]ithout an express written statement decedent intent cannot be known and, thus, any
requests for sperm retrieval must be denied.").
133 Id.
134 See, for example, New York Hospital Guidelines (cited in note 41).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Peter N. Schlegel, Is Postmortem Sperm Retrieval Ethical if the Deceased Did Not
Leave Exolicit Instructions, OB/GYN News (Aug 1, 2003).
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sion for PMGR, the consent requirements are actually substi-
tuted judgment requirements.
In a recent request for PMGR, for example, the spouse of a
dying man was able to convince the urologist to accede to her
request based on a comment her husband had made ten years
earlier.138 The husband and wife had viewed a telecast about a
woman who had requested PMGR from her murdered husband.
When the wife asked her then-healthy husband what she should
do if ever faced with such a situation, he replied, "If it's really
tragic, go for it." 139 Years later, when the husband was comatose
and on a ventilator, the wife got in touch with Dr. Peter Schlegel,
the urologist from the telecast. She told the doctor that she and
her husband had been trying to have a child and repeated her
husband's offhand comment about sperm retrieval. 4 ° Shortly
after the husband's death, Dr. Schlegel removed a specimen from
one of the husband's testicles. Six years later the wife tried to
become pregnant using the sperm using IVF but the stored
sperm was not viable.
Although in this case the request was honored, Dr. Schlegel
favors "a prudential, conservative approach ... including clear
evidence that the deceased man had wanted his sperm to be used
to father a child." 4' Query whether evidence of the husband's
intentions from ten years ago is evidence of his current inten-
tions at the time of his death.'
Some of the current guidelines are both benevolent and in-
trusive. A common feature of these protocols is a one-year wait-
ing period and quarantine on the use of gametes. The one-year
period is believed to be "the initial period of psychological ad-
justment and bereavement after the loss of a loved one."143 We
are told that "this one-year quarantine .. . lets women go
through the grieving process."' Further, the wife is to undergo
medical and psychological consultations which "should include a
basic assessment of the psychological status of the wife, family,
138 Barron H. Lerner, In a Wife's Request at her Husband's Deathbed, Ethics are an




142 Schlegel, Is Postmortem Sperm Retrieval Ethical, OB/GYN News (cited in note
137). Dr. Schegel, who is the acting Chairman of the Department of Urology at Cornell
University, New York, has stated that a doctor following their guidelines would probably
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social and financial support systems as well as a discussion of
the implications of raising the child as a single parent without its
genetic father."1 4 5 Moreover, there should be discussion of disclos-
ing to the child the method of conception.'46 What is not men-
tioned is the fact that the child will have no legal father and will
not be recognized as an heir.4 '
It is expected that the waiting period and the counseling
that the wife is to receive will enable her to make a more "ra-
tional" decision when the period of grief has passed." s This ra-
tionale assumes that everyone grieves in the same way and that
there is a point at which grief ends. Both of these assumptions
are questionable and reveal a linear approach to a process which
is more chaotic than straightforward. Further, no matter how
benign the intentions behind the one-year quarantine, it pre-
sents a serious barrier to the procreative hopes of a recipient who
suffers from premature ovarian failure, is at the outer limit of
her reproductive years, or has some other condition that de-
mands immediate rather than later use of the sperm. 4 9
Since use of the gametes is downstream from the decision to
harvest them, it is not clear that the limitations imposed by
these protocols will bind the storage facility when the sperm is
available for use under the regulations of the storage facility.
Nor is it clear that the one-year quarantine will ease the grieving
process. In fact, having the gametes preserved and possibly
available may well prolong it."' There is also the question of
whether the requirements as they pertain to wives are not
somewhat condescending and paternalistic. Since there is so lit-
tle, if any, empirical evidence regarding the effect of postmortem
conception on anyone, including the spouse, partner, or the child,
there is an element of speculation and possible bias in the con-
cerns expressed in the protocols. In this respect, the University
of Virginia has the most detailed and thoughtful of the protocols
145 Id.
146 Id. These guidelines make plain that physicians are the gatekeepers of parenthood,
just as they are in almost all cases where assisted reproductive technologies ("ARTS") are
used.
147 See ASRM, 82 Fertility and Sterility Supp at S260 (cited in note 7) ("[A] child born
from conception and pregnancy after a man's death may not always be attributed to him
for purposes of inheritance and legitimacy.").
148 New York Hospital Guidelines (cited in note 41).
149 See, for example, Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of "Co-
erced Parenthood" in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 Am U L Rev 1021, 1054-55 (2004)
(discussing data demonstrating that a woman's reproductive capacity is impaired by the
passage of time).
15;' Lori B. Andrews, The Clone Age 233 (Owl Books 2000).
310 [2006:
UTILIZING GAMETES FROM THE DEAD
surveyed for this article. Their protocol requires not only the do-
nor's consent to the sperm retrieval but also the recipient's con-
sent to "the triangular relationship between himself or herself,
the gamete donor and the health-care team."'51 Along with de-
tailed information concerning the gamete recipient's responsibili-
ties, the limited role and responsibility of the institution, and
various housekeeping details, there is a requirement for psycho-
logical counseling and approval before the release and use of the
stored gametes. There is, however, no waiting period. Despite the
care and thought that has gone into the protocol, it shares with
the others the effect of making physicians the gatekeepers to
parenthood, just as is the case with all assisted reproduction.'52
A very practical concern, the matter of cost, is not mentioned
in the protocols discussed in this article. Dr. Michael Soules has
noted: "Based on current charges for medical and reproductive
laboratory procedures, [harvesting and cryopreservation] would
generate moderate fees (several thousands of dollars)."'53 Dr.
Soules further notes that it is unlikely that insurance would
cover the cost; accordingly, the person requesting the procedures
would have to pay,' questioning the accuracy of Dr. Soules's
characterization of the fee as "moderate." When we consider the
low success rate of IVF in general, the unknown but undoubtedly
low success rate with the use of gametes harvested postmortem,
and the fact that most women who have had their husbands'
sperm collected after death never use the sperm,' we might
conclude that there should be a mandated disclosure of the
unlikelihood of a child resulting from PMGR.
V. PROCREATIVE LIBERTY AND PMGR
If we look at PMGR through the lens of reproductive rights,
we must first determine whose procreative rights are at issue.
The dead are not usually thought of as having rights that survive
death, but, as noted above, procreative rights are exceptional.'56
151 Finnerty, et al, 2 Current Women's Health Reps at 176 (cited in note 4).
152 See, for example, Katz, 8 Albany L J Sci & Tech at 33 (1997) (cited in note 81)
("Interference with procreational choice, based on 'unworthy' reasons, comes not from the
state but from the medical profession, inasmuch as physicians have been allowed to be
the gatekeepers deciding who is eligible to utilize the technologies under their control.").
153 Soules, 27 J L Med & Ethics at 363 (cited in note 4).
'54 Id.
155 Lerner, In a Wife's Request, NY Times at F1 (cited in note 138).
156 But see Jordan, 22 Ga L Rev at 1108-12 (cited in note 12) (detailing a case where
discontinuation of end-of-life treatment, she had no right to discontinue life support when
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Moreover, we do honor the wishes of the dead as to the disposi-
tion of property even though we could just as easily say that
death ends all property rights. We do not speak of our deceased
loved ones as corpses even though metaphysically the decedent
has left the body. If an individual has expressed clear intention
to procreate with a particular individual or not to procreate, then
those wishes should be honored in the same way that testamen-
tary provisions receive deference." Of course, if a testamentary
provision violates public policy it will not honored. If utilization
of the gametes would result in consanguinity, for example, the
provision would be invalid. 5 ' The difficulty is that in most in-
stances where there is a request for PMGR, the deceased has left
no instructions.
The issue then becomes whether the one requesting the
PMGR has a right to procreate, including the right to use the
gametes of the deceased in absence of explicit evidence of the de-
ceased's intentions. If both parties were alive, there would be no
question that one's choice of a willing procreative partner is pro-
tected under notions of reproductive privacy.'59 It is because of
the difficulty of ascertaining the wishes of a dead or comatose
patient that medical institutions, such as the University of Vir-
ginia, have required advance directives. Others are willing to
consider evidence from other sources such as family members or
clergy. 6 ° Although the right not to procreate has received explicit
constitutional recognition,' 6 ' whether there is an affirmative
right to procreate under any circumstances is arguable.'62
the life of the fetus was at stake).
117 See Schiff, 75 NC L Rev at 965 (cited in note 1) ("[T]he interests involved ought to
be weighed with reference to the same principles that apply in a conflict over the use or
non-use of IVF embryos when both progenitors are alive.").
158 Gottenger and Nagler, 20 J Andrology at 459 (cited in note 2).
159 See, for example, AZ v BZ, 725 NE2d 1051, 1059 (Mass 2001) (declining to enforce
an agreement that would force one party to become a parent against his will in part be-
cause "respect for liberty and privacy requires that individuals be accorded the freedom to
decide whether to enter into a family relationship"); JB v MB, 783 A2d 707 (NJ 2001)
(citing several cases upholding the right to privacy in procreation and marital relation-
ships).
160 Finnerty, et al, 2 Current Women's Health Reports at 175-78 (cited in note 4),
citing P.A. Ohl, et al, Procreation Alter Death or Medical Incompetence: Medical Ad-
vances or Technology Gone Awry, 66 Fertility and Sterility 889, 889-895 (1996).
161 See, for example, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965) (holding that the use
of contraceptives by a married couple was protected against a government ban); Eisen-
stadt v Baird, 405 US 438 (1972) (finding that whatever right of access to contraceptives
is for married couples, equal protection requires that umnarried individuals enjoy same
right); Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause protects woman's decision to terminate pregnancy); Carey v Population
Services International, 431 US 678 (1977) (striking bans on distribution of contraceptives
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It we define the issue very narrowly as a question of whether
there exists a right to harvest the gametes of a dead person for
use in a spouse or paramour's attempts to bear or beget the de-
ceased's child, then the answer is probably going to be no. The
Supreme Court generally looks to history and tradition in deter-
mining whether an interest is constitutionally protected.163 Nei-
ther will help here. If the issue is framed in more inclusive
terms-in other words, as whether there is a right to procreate
with a partner of one's choice-then history and tradition are on
the side of the proponent. However, that right is limited by the
requirement that the partner must consent. I conclude that cur-
rent Supreme Court jurisprudence protects the procreative lib-
erty only of the decedent who left explicit instructions regarding
procreation after death.
VI. WHAT ABOUT THE CHILD?
The existing hospital protocols on PMGR are concerned
about the child who may be born as a result of PMGR to the ex-
tent that they question whether a child should be deliberately
conceived without a father (or mother)." This is primarily a so-
cial and psychological issue. There is no uniform policy against
single parenthood. To the extent that such a policy existed in
adoption laws or is present in laws that limit the utilization of
reproductive aid to married couples, the wave of the future is to
abandon such boundaries. Several commentators have noted that
there are millions of children being raised in single parent
homes.'65 Furthermore, although this is a frequently mentioned
issue in protocols and in debates over PMGR, there is no mention
to minors and barring all distribution of contraceptives except by licensed pharmacists).
162 See, for example, Katheryn D. Katz, Lawrence v. Texas: A Case for Cautious Op-
timism Regarding Procreative Liberty, 25 Women's Rts L Rep 249, 249-50, 252-53 (2004).
163 See County of Sacramento v Lewis, 523 US 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy concurring)
("That said, it must be added that history and tradition are the starting point, but not in
all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.").
164 See New York Hospital Guidelines (cited in note 41) ("Consultation should include
a ... discussion of the implications of raising a child as a single parent without its genetic
father.").
165 See Collins, 30 J Med & Philosophy at 434 (cited in note 91) ("[A]s a result of the
high divorce rate, the increasing acceptance of gay parenting and possibilities such as
surrogacy, there are many more single parent families and also more situations where
the social parent is different from the genetic parent."); Waldman, 53 Am U L Rev at 1040
(cited in note 149) ("Divorce rates remain steady at roughly 50 percent while non-marital
childbearing continues to increase. With the two-parent family in retreat on multiple
fronts. researchers are examining thn pffo,4o nP f  oir- n 1 A -- ;--g tiz-..
nomic and psychological well-being of children.").
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of the weight or effect this consideration should be given in decid-
ing whether to harvest gametes from the dead.
The fact that single parenthood is commonplace does not an-
swer the question of the status of a child conceived through the
use of gametes harvested postmortem. Is a child the legitimate
child of the dead parent? Is the child a presumptive heir? In
truth, the answer to these questions is to a large extent un-
known. (This uncertainty extends to any child conceived post-
mortem, such as by artificial insemination with sperm harvested
before the father's death.) Accordingly, physicians who want to
perform a beneficent act by acceding to a PMGR request should
not be sanguine about the legal status of a subsequent child. The
law in the jurisdictions that have considered these questions is
not supportive of postmortem conception without the decedent's
explicit premortem consent. 1
66
The drafters of the former Uniform Status of Children of As-
sisted Conception Act ("USCACA") denied legal parentage to any
child conceived after the death of the donor. In other words, the
donor of the gametes is not considered a parent of the resulting
child. That means that the child would be considered a non-
marital child even if the parents were married. It also means
that the child would not be entitled to Social Security benefits,
military service benefits, or other benefits from the deceased par-
ent and would not be able to bring a wrongful death action for
the death of that parent. In order to avoid disinheriting his child,
the donor would have to have specific provisions in his or her will
recognizing and providing for posthumously conceived children.
The Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA") 67 provides that if as-
sisted reproduction occurred after a provider of ova, sperm, or
genetic material for an embryo died, that provider will not be
considered a parent unless he has given written consent to be
treated as a parent.168 Four states have adopted the UPA and a
166 See, for example, Woodward v Commissioner of Social Security, 760 NE2d 257
(2002) (holding that before a posthumously conceived child can inherit from his father,
the father's consent to conception and support the child and his genetic relationship to
the children must be proven); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A2d 1257 (2000) (holding that
posthumously conceived twins born nearly eighteen months after father's death could be
legal heirs of dead father; court accepted mother's statement that decedent consented to
father a child after his death; suggested that imposing time limits would be fair and con-
stitutional); Gllett-Netting v Barnhart, 371 F3d 593 (9th Cir 2004) (holding that post-
humously conceived children who were legitimate under Arizona law need not meet addi-
tional requirements under the Social Security law).
167 9-B ULA 354-385 (2000), amended 2002 (Supp 2005).
168 Tj -, iz ,7n
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number of states are considering adopting the Act.169 A number
of other states have already adopted legislative changes that
limit the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived chil-
dren. 70
There are also psychological and social issues to consider. It
is difficult, however, to state with any certainty what the effect
will be of learning that one was conceived using the gametes of a
deceased person. It may be that the psychological impact is the
same as in the case of any child raised without a father. Further,
it is not necessarily true that the child will be raised without a
social father. Is there any way that the urologists who are asked
to retrieve gametes postmortem and must make a time-
pressured decision can ensure that the child is raised in an ap-
propriately supportive environment, as some protocols have sug-
gested they do? Should that be a concern of the medical person-
nel involved in the decision whether to honor the request?
What about other children of the deceased? Should their
wishes be consulted? Again, although they are silent as to the
effect of such a consideration on the decision to harvest gametes
postmortem, some of the protocols include this concern. Query
whether this is a decision which should be considered beyond the
competence of the medical practitioner.
Timothy F. Murphy, a medical ethicist, and Gladys B.
White, a bioethicist, have encapsulated the dilemma of PMGR for
any resulting children. They suggest that postmortem gamete
collection (and other biomedical innovations) raise the questions:
"What identities are possible for children born with [the help of
these innovations], when connections to deceased parents are
simply biological? Are we forging new opportunities for human
intimacy and well-being or fracturing the dynamics essential to
family life? "'7'
CONCLUSION
Postmortem gamete retrieval is a practice that cries out for
guidelines. The question that will have to be answered, sooner
rather than later, is where the locus of decisionmaking authority
169 Susan N. Gray, Posthumously Conceived Heirs, 19 Probate & Property (ABA)
(March/April 2005).
170 Id.
171 Timothy F. Murphy and Gladys B. White, Dead Sperm Donors or World Hunger:
2005).
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should be. Is there a need for legislative intervention or should
we continue to regard the matter as one of medical ethics? I be-
lieve that medical institutions are to be commended for grappling
with these difficult issues. Nevertheless, in order to protect the
decedent's reproductive rights, requests for PMGR should be
honored only when there is explicit prior consent from the dece-
dent. Protocols to this effect would provide clarity and certainty
to the urologists and emergency room physicians who are asked
to make decisions that call for prescience beyond anyone's abili-
ties. Although it is not evident that the legislation addressing
PMGR itself is necessary,'72 it is clear that there must be legisla-
tion to clarify the status of children born as the result of PMGR.
172 See Ronald Chester, Double Trouble: Legal Solutions to the Medical Problems of
Unconsented Sperm Harvesting and Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies, 44 SLU L J 451
(2000) (concluding that the best non-statutory method to address unconsented sperm
harvesting is the injunction).
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